Pennsylvania expands definition of "race" in anti-discrimination law

Pennsylvania’s Independent Regulatory Review Commission approved changes to the regulations defining "race" in Pennsylvania's workplace anti-discrimination law, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA). The changes will also impact housing and public accommodations provision, but this is an employment law blog, soooo. Also note that additional changes address sex and sexual orientation, and religious creeds, but more on that later this week...

You can read the actual proposal here. Most notably, the regulations prohibit discrimination on the basis of "ethnic characteristics," "traits associated with race," and "interracial marriage and association."

"Traits associated with race" include "hair texture and protective hairstyles, such as braids, locks, and twists."

"Ethnic characteristics" include "physical characteristics such as skin and hair color, body size, and facial features typical of persons of a particular cultural or social background: linguistic characteristics such as language or dialect; behavioral or cultural characteristics such as religion or customs: environmental characteristics such as living in the same area or region."

Just for good measure, they also threw in, "Hispanic ancestry, national origin, or ethnic characteristics, including, but not limited to, persons of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Central or South American, or other Spanish origin or culture."

5th Circuit: One N-word is enough to create a hostile work environment

Under Title VII, a hostile work environment claim requires harassment that is "severe or pervasive." A single incident can be severe enough to meet this standard. Ordinarily though, a single incident of verbal (as opposed to physical) harassment will not meet this standard. 

Not official use. 

Last week, in Woods v. Cantrell, the Fifth Circuit held that a supervisor calling his subordinate a "Lazy Monkey A__ N_____" in front of his co-workers was severe enough to state claim. I've published the racial epithet as it appears in the (very short) opinion, which includes a footnote, "The racial epithet is not further spelled out anywhere in the record." 

The Court relied in part on a case I wrote about when then-Judge Kavanaugh was nominated to SCOTUS in which he noted "No other word in the English language so powerfully or instantly calls to mind our country's long and brutal struggle to overcome racism and discrimination against African–Americans" (similarly concluding that a single use of the N-word by a subordinate would create a hostile work environment). 

Third Circuit: Firing for Facebook post provides defense to discrimination claim

 A short but interesting non-precedential opinion from the Third Circuit in Ellis v. BNY Mellon Corp. A white employee alleged that BNY Mellon discriminated against her by firing her for an offensive Facebook post, while not terminating black employees who also posted offensive things on social media. 

The Court concluded that not all offensive Facebook posts are created equal:

Not official use.

In response to a news story about a man who faced criminal charges for driving his car into a crowd of protesters, Ellis commented: “Total BS. Too bad he didn[’]t have a bus to plow thr[ough].” Neither supposedly-similar employee said anything as extreme. One expressed frustration with a white co-worker but did not threaten that co-worker with violence, let alone serious bodily harm or death. The other opined that men who hurt women should commit suicide. Though inappropriate and ill-advised, neither post encouraged mass violence against protesters, as Ellis’s did. Thus, no reasonable jury could find Ellis’s conduct comparable to that of her former colleagues.

I'm not sure I agree that "no reasonable jury" could find the posts comparably offensive, and that the plaintiff's post was more offensive as a matter of law. That said, the supposed comparators "worked in different positions, in different departments, had different responsibilities, and reported to different supervisors than Ellis did." So, it's unlikely Ellis would have made out a prima facie case even if the posts were deemed sufficiently comparable. 

Judge Amy Coney Barrett and the Case of the Last-Minute N-Word

 Back to some Judge Amy Coney Barrett employment law. Today's episode features Smith v. Illinois Dept. of Transportation. This was a hostile work environment and retaliation case, with a twist at the end. 

The employee alleged that he was told to "shut the f[] up," called a "stupid dumb motherf[]," and one guy threatened to "kick [his] ass" (f-words quoted as they appear in the opinion - you know I'd ordinarily let 'em fly in quotations). Does that create a hostile work environment claim? No. Why? No signs of discriminatory intent - hostile work environment claims arise under the discrimination statutes, so just being hostile is not enough. 

What about his retaliation claims? Well, the problem there was that he had a long, documented history of performance issues that were unrelated to any of his protected activity:

He received multiple ratings of “unsatisfactory” in two different formal performance reviews. His failings as an employee were chronicled in conversations and emails from a number of different supervisors and coworkers, who considered him unsafe, argumentative, and unable to follow instructions.

So, no retaliation claim either. 

Are you ready for the twist? Near the end of his employment, a former supervisor allegedly called him a "stupid ass ni[]." Judge Barrett acknowledged that this particular racial epithet "falls on the more severe end of the spectrum." Ultimately, she still affirmed summary judgment for the employer. Why? 

• "He introduced no evidence that Colbert’s use of the n-word changed his subjective experience of the workplace." Instead, "his supervisors made him miserable throughout his employment," but for reasons unrelated to race, and there was no evidence that this last epithet subjectively made things worse.

• And, his employment was already over. "The Department had initiated termination proceedings against Smith two weeks before, so he knew that he was about to be fired. And while things certainly could have gotten worse for Smith after the racially charged confrontation with Colbert, he offers no evidence that they did."

I've already seen some criticism of this decision. Although it was a panel decision affirming the district court (i.e. the four judges who looked at it all reached the same conclusion), I could also see a different panel coming out the other way. One could also contrast this opinion and then-Judge Kavanaugh's dicta on whether one n-word is enough to create a hostile work environment (that said, the facts on which Judge Barrett based her conclusion were not present in Judge Kavanaugh's case). 

SCOTUS applies "but for" standard to race claims under s1981

I've been so busy trying to keep up with pandemic pandemonium that I completely missed this SCOTUS decision that came out yesterday: Comcast Corp. v. National Association of African American-Owned Media.

Federal statute, 42 U. S. C. §1981(a), guarantees, “[a]ll persons . . . the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” In other words, it prohibits race discrimination when making and enforcing contracts. Per the syllabus, the Court held "
A §1981 plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the plaintiff’s race was a but-for cause of its injury, and that burden remains constant over the life of the lawsuit."

Helpful reminder that many courts have shut down physical locations or postponed certain in-person activities - but the courts are still conducting business.

Thoughts on "Preferably Caucasian" job posting

Uh, hey @cynetjobs - what's with this?

Your job listing for a mid-senior level business development position's top qualification is "Preferably Caucasian"

How could you POSSIBLY think that's okay? pic.twitter.com/DPWzpgXqqE

— Helena McCabe (@misshelenasue) April 27, 2019

No.

No, no, no, no, no, no, no.

Takeaways: No.

Kavanaugh, the N-word, and Hostile Work Environment

To state a hostile work environment claim, an employee must allege that (s)he was subjected to discriminatory harassment that was "severe or pervasive." What about one incident? Obviously, that's not pervasive; but, when is one incident severe enough to create a hostile work environment?

New SCOTUS nominee, Judge Kavanaugh, addressed this issue in a concurring opinion in Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae. A Fannie Mae vice president allegedly yelled at an African-American employee to "get out of my office ni**er." So, how about it? Was that one verbal incident enough? Judge Kavanaugh says yes:

It may be difficult to fully catalogue the various verbal insults and epithets that by themselves could create a hostile work environment. And there may be close cases at the margins. But, in my view, being called the n-word by a supervisor—as Ayissi–Etoh alleges happened to him—suffices by itself to establish a racially hostile work environment . . . No other word in the English language so powerfully or instantly calls to mind our country's long and brutal struggle to overcome racism and discrimination against African–Americans . . . . Here, as I see it, the alleged statement by the Fannie Mae Vice President to Ayissi–Etoh itself would establish a hostile work environment.

 HT: Robin Shea and Jon Hyman.

Third Circuit on Hostile Work Environment (Is one "n-word" enough?)

Last week, the Third Circuit issued a precedential opinion in Castleberry v. STI Group. It's an interesting opinion, on appeal from a dismissal at the pleadings stage, on the legal standard for hostile work environment claims.

One issue is very clear: the correct standard is that the harassment must be severe or pervasive - meaning that either one very severe event or a slew of not-so-serious events may suffice to state a claim (or, presumably, some combination).

Not official use.

At one point, the Court frames the issue as:

Under the correct “severe or pervasive” standard, the parties dispute whether the supervisor’s single use of the “n-word” is adequately “severe” and if one isolated incident is sufficient to state a claim under that standard.

The Court appears to conclude that, yes indeed, one n-word can be enough. Although, the Court notes that "the resolution of that question is context-specific." Also, strangely, that does not appear to be the actual issue presented by the facts.

Here Plaintiffs alleged that their supervisor used a racially charged slur in front of them and their non-African- American coworkers. Within the same breath, the use of this word was accompanied by threats of termination (which ultimately occurred). This constitutes severe conduct that could create a hostile work environment. Moreover, the allegations could satisfy the “pervasive” alternative established by the standard. Plaintiffs alleged that not only did their supervisor make the derogatory comment, but “on several occasions” their sign-in sheets bore racially discriminatory comments and that they were required to do menial tasks while their white colleagues (who were less experienced) were instructed to perform more complex work. Whether these allegations are true and whether they amount to “pervasiveness” are questions to be answered after discovery (for example, after determining how many times racial remarks were scribbled on the sign-in sheets). Plaintiffs have pled a plausible claim of a hostile work environment under either theory—that the harassment was “severe” or “pervasive.”

What if the slur were not accompanied by threats of termination that came to fruition? What if we were at summary judgment instead of the pleadings stage? The Court stops short of holding that one racial slur is always enough - but it came pretty close.

Sidenote: This was a Section 1981 race discrimination in contracts claim - but presumably the same analysis would apply to the more common Title VII discrimination an hostile work environment claims.

Is race discrimination bad for business?

Economics tells us businesses that discriminate based on race are at a competitive disadvantage against non-discriminating firms. Common sense tell us that the discriminators also face increased costs imposed by anti-discrimination statutes (assuming the enforcement mechanisms of EEOC, state agency, and private litigation impose higher costs on discriminating firms). Do we have empirical evidence to confirm these theories?

Yes! Well, we at least have a start. Economist Alex Tabarrok at Marginal Revolution (and faculty at my law school alma mater, George Mason!) blogs Firms that Discriminate are More Likely to Go Bust. He links to a paper published in Sociological Science (Are Firms That Discriminate More Likely to Go Out of Business?) and notes:

The author, Devah Pager, is a pioneer in using field experiments to study discrimination. In 2004, she and co-authors, Bruce Western and Bart Bonikowski, ran an audit study on discrimination in New York using job applicants with similar resumes but different races and they found significant discrimination in callbacks. Now Pager has gone back to that data and asks what happened to those firms by 2010? She finds that 36% of the firms that discriminated failed but only 17% of the non-discriminatory firms failed.

As noted above, this seems logical; but, it's nice to have some actual data.

That White Guy Lost . . .

Yes, white males are a protected class... I blogged about this a year and a half ago. One of the cases I cited was Burlington v. News Corp. The employee, a white guy, was fired for using the n-word. He filed a race discrimination lawsuit, claiming that black employees use the word without discipline.

I give him credit for managing to clear the summary judgment hurdle, but all that gets you is a jury trial. Did you really think a jury was gonna be like, "yeah, it's totally the same when white people use racial slurs!" If you did, you were wrong - at least in this instance: Jury Issues Defense Verdict in Case of Anchor Fired for Racial Slur.

White anchor's "how come they can say it" argument still going . . . .

Burlington v. News Corp. is a great case for highlighting "reverse discrimination" claims. A white news anchor used the n-word in a meeting and got fired. Sounds reasonable, right? The problem is that he claims black employees used the same word and were not terminated. Suddenly, he has something that sounds like a discrimination lawsuit.

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied full summary judgment in this case back in 2010 - so, I assumed it was over by now. I was wrong. The Court just issued another opinion last week. Short version: Plaintiff can go to trial on a Cat's Paw theory of discrimination.

What was the hold-up? I guess they were waiting for the Supreme Court to issue its opinion in Staub v. Proctor Hospital, explaining Cat's Paw discrimination (which is generally when a non-decisionmaker proximately causes an adverse employment action and does so with discriminatory animus). Although even that was more than three years ago.

In any event, another reminder to employers that white men are protected by discrimination statutes too. Do I think this guy's "how come they can say it" (my name for his theory, not his) will be successful at trial? I'd be surprised. But I guess we'll see.

Body Odor Fails to Establish Pretext

Hannoon v. Fawn Engineering Corp. out of the 8th Circuit starts off like a pretty routine discrimination case. The plaintiff claims he was fired based on his race and national origin. The employer counters with a legitimate non-discriminatory reason, here his poor performance. And the burden shifts to the employee to establish that the proffered rationale was pretext.

Here's where things get interesting. The Court turns to the issue of . . . body odor?

First, [the employee] argues that the confrontation concerning body odor demonstrates animus concerning race or national origin. We disagree. Because the comments regarding body odor did not suggest any reference to race or national origin, we are unwilling to hold such comments reasonably capable of supporting an inference of discriminatory intent. 

[The employee] attempts to bolster his argument on this point by noting that Wayne did not need to confront him, but rather could have referred him to Fawn's employee medical assistance program. As an initial matter, while we understand that comments from a supervisor to a subordinate concerning the delicate issue of body odor are, no doubt, distressing to all involved, we do not believe that a reasonable jury could find such comments to be race-based, inherently discriminatory, or the type of matter that requires referral to a medical assistance program. Further, there is no evidence that [the employee's] body odor problem was a medical issue rather than merely an issue of personal hygiene.

Apparently, complaints about body odor do not establish pretext. The 8th Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the employer.

HT: Thanks to my colleague Janine Gismondi for alerting me to this case.

Butt-Grabber Clears Summary Judgment Hurdle

When an employee assaults a woman in the course of his employment, that's usually a pretty safe termination right? That's what I thought until I read Mitchell v. City of Pittsburgh (opinion here). HT: Eric Meyer who put the Complaint on Scribd and blogged about this case yesterday.

Prior to terminating the now-plaintiff, the employer received the following complaint:

[A nurse] stated . . . that as the patient was about to be moved, [Plaintiff, an EMT,] walked up behind her and brushed up against her, which took her by surprise. [The nurse] stated that seconds later [Plaintiff] grabbed her buttocks, and placed his fingers “very close to [her] private area.” [The nurse] stated she objected immediately, and [Plaintiff] responded: “That was for Valentine’s Day, they call me walking chocolate.” . . . . [The nurse] related that “[Plaintiff] placed both hands . . . near her vaginal area and her heels lifted off the ground,” adding that she “bolted upright” and said, “Excuse me! What was that?”

After an investigation, the employer terminated the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed race and age discrimination claims against the employer.

He has no chance of winning, right? Not so fast. The Court noted several "similar" incidents in which white employees were not terminated. I put "similar" in quotes because I think it's at least questionable whether they are really similar to the allegations against the plaintiff here.

Generally, they entail paramedics striking patients who were intoxicated and/or combative. Call me crazy, but I think smacking someone who is punching you is slightly different from randomly groping a co-worker's butt. The Court saw it differently though and held that a jury could find that the employer treated "similarly situated" white employees better than it treated the black plaintiff.

Update on Protected White Males (I Got the Doc!)

Ask and ye shall receive. In my last post, explaining that white males are a protected class, I asked readers for docs pertaining to the case in which the Archie's Comics CEO claimed white males are not a protected class. Well, reader Mark E. Moore came up huge!

He emailed me the Defendant's brief, which I have uploaded to Google Docs (here). Upon review, here are some additional thoughts:

• It's a motion to dismiss relying on several arguments. Defendant is hardly hanging her hat on the defense that white males are not a protected class. That said, the brief clearly states in no uncertain terms, "White males are not a member of a protected class under this section of the HRL (New York's Human Rights Law)."
• In my post, I explained that white males are protected under federal law with the caveat that it might be different under state law. Here, the NY statute uses the same "because of . . . race/sex" language used in Title VII. Presumably, it protects whites and males as well (although I have not researched the issue under NY law at all).
• The brief fails to cite the specific section of the HRL to which it is referring, and similarly fails to cite anything supporting the assertion that white males aren't protected. I am not persuaded.

In any event, I thought you might be interested in reading the actual arguments in the docs. Thanks again Mark!

Yes, White Males Are a Protected Class

I feel like this story is too stupid to be true . . . yet here we are. I first heard about it via Jon Hyman, although it is now blowing up into the mainstream media (see CNN front page news item here). The CEO of Archie Comics is accused of calling male employees "penis" in a recent lawsuit - and her defense? According to the reports, her lawyer (really?) is proffering as her defense that white males are not a protected class under employment discrimination statutes.

Let me assure you that this is wrong - at least as it pertains to federal employment discrimination laws.

It is well settled that Title VII's prohibition of race-based discrimination protects white employees as well as minority employees. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278–79, 96 S.Ct. 2574, 49 L.Ed.2d 493 (1976) (stating that Title VII is “not limited to discrimination against members of any particular race”).

Burlington v. News Corp., 759 F. Supp. 2d 580, 596 (E.D. Pa. 2010). The plaintiff in Burlington? A white guy claiming he was fired for using the n-word while black employees used it without discipline. The Court allowed his claim to proceed past summary judgment to a jury (although I'm not sure what ever happened to this case - chime in with a comment if you know). So yes, whites are covered.

And what about men? Yup. Covered. In fact, EEOC charge statistics show that as of 2011, over 16% of sexual harassment charges were filed by men.

Title VII's prohibition of discrimination “because of ... sex” protects men as well as women.

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78, 118 S. Ct. 998, 1001, 140 L. Ed. 2d 201 (1998). And, in case you're wondering, Oncale also explains that employees may face race and/or sex discrimination from members of the same race and/or sex.

I'd like to see a copy of the actual court filing to see if there's some unreported nuance in this Archie case (like the lawsuit was brought under some state law that actually doesn't protect white males). If you have a link, drop a comment.

"Race Raters" Inadmissible - COTW #145

This Case of the Week goes back a few months, but it's an interesting issue so I decided to drop it in here.

The EEOC filed a disparate impact lawsuit against Kaplan Higher Learning Education Corp. for its use of credit reports in background checks. To establish a disparate impact based on race, the EEOC proffered statistics - but they didn't have the actual race of each applicant. Instead, the EEOC relied on "race raters" to identify the race of each individual using his or her driver's license photos:

In order to determine the race of a particular applicant, the EEOC subpoenaed records from the Departments of Motor Vehicles (“DMVs”) from 38 states and the District of Columbia. Fourteen states and the District of Columbia provided records that identified an applicant's race. The remaining 24 states provided copies of the driver's license photos pertaining to the applicants. In order to determine the race of applicants from these states, Dr. Murphy assembled a team of five “race raters,” who were asked to review each photograph and determine whether the individual is “African–American,” “Asian,” “Hispanic,” “White,” or “Other.” Individuals considered “multi-racial” were adjudged “Other.” Dr. Murphy required that four of the five “race raters” agree (80%) in order to consider that applicant's race. In all, the “race raters” were shown 891 photographs. In 11.7% of the photographs, the “race raters” were unable to achieve an 80% consensus with regard to the applicant's race.

Equal Opportunity Employment Comm'n v. Kaplan Higher Learning Edu. Corp., 1:10 CV 2882, 2013 WL 322116 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 28, 2013) reconsideration denied, 1:10 CV 2882, 2013 WL 1891365 (N.D. Ohio May 6, 2013).

The Court granted the defendant's motions to exclude the evidence and enter summary judgment.

An interesting sidenote: discovery revealed that the EEOC itself used credit checks for 84 of its 97 positions. Per the EEOC handbook, the EEOC uses credit checks because "overdue just debts increase temptation to commit illegal or unethical acts as a means of gaining funds to meet financial obligations."

HT: My McQuaide Blasko colleague, Janine Gismondi.

"No African American Nurse to Take Care of Baby" - COTW #131

The Case of the Week is Battle v. Hurley Medical Center (complaint)(HT: Jon Hyman). A nurse filed a lawsuit against the hospital for accommodating the requests of a racist patient.

The African American plaintiff was a nurse, caring for an infant. The infant's father allegedly requested to speak with the nurse's supervisor:

The father told the Charge Nurse that he did not want any African Americans taking care of his baby. While telling the Charge Nurse, he pulled up his sleeve and showed some type of tattoo which was believed to be a swastika of some kind.

Amazingly, instead of telling this guy "tough luck" (or some variation thereof), the hospital allegedly accommodated his request! The Complaint claims the hospital reassigned the baby to another nurse. And, just when you think it can't get any worse, they then allegedly put a sign on the baby's clipboard that read "NO AFRICAN AMERICAN NURSE TO TAKE CARE OF BABY."

As Jon Hyman pointed out in his post on this case - customer preferences generally do not provide cover for race discrimination in the workplace. If the allegations are true, it could be a tough round of litigation for the hospital.

2012 SCOTUS Employment Law Preview!

It's here! The new SCOTUS season kicks off today! Let's see what kind of employment law goodies the Court has in store for us (in order of my personal preference):

Supervisor Liability
In Vance v. Ball State University, the Supreme Court will determine who counts as a supervisor in harassment cases. Question presented:

Whether, as the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have held, the Faragher and Ellerth “supervisor” liability rule (i) applies to harassment by those whom the employer vests with authority to direct and oversee their victim’s daily work, or, as the First, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have held (ii) is limited to those harassers who have the power to “hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline” their victim.

You can read my previous coverage here, or check out SCOTUSblog's coverage here.

FLSA "Pick Off" Case
Straight from my home circuit (that's the Third Circuit), the Supreme Court will address whether a defendant may "pick off" the sole plaintiff in a potential FLSA collective action, effectively killing the case. Question presented:

Whether a case becomes moot, and thus beyond the judicial power of Article III, when the lone plaintiff receives an offer from the defendants to satisfy all of the plaintiff ’s claims.

You can read my analysis of the Third Circuit opinion here, and the grant of cert. here, and SCOTUSblog's coverage here. I love it when the Supremes agree to hear an old Case of the Week!

ERISA
Another one from the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court will delve into the dry dry world of ERISA statutory interpretation in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen. Question presented:

Whether the Third Circuit correctly held—in conflict with the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits—that ERISA Section 502(a)(3) authorizes courts to use equitable principles to rewrite contractual language and refuse to order participants to reimburse their plan for benefits paid, even where the plan’s terms give it an absolute right to full reimbursement.

Read my previous coverage here, or SCOTUSblog's coverage here.

Miscellaneous
There are a few more cases that have some employment law-ish overtones, or focus on narrow issues. For example, Comcast v. Behrend (SCOTUSblog) will address the evidentiary burden for class certification at a district court (not an employment law class action in this case, but could still have some ramifications). The Court will address a jurisdictional issue for mixed cases (disputed termination and unlawful discrimination) involving federal employees in Kloeckner v. Solis (SCOTUSblog). Finally, the Court will analyze the use of race in university undergraduate admissions in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (SCOTUSblog) (not technically employment law, but you never know how issues involving race discrimination and the Equal Protection Clause may creep into subsequent employment law analysis).

I'll be on the lookout for more employment law cases as the Supreme Court grants petitions for certiorari. Also, note that the Supreme Court will now be issuing opinions and orders at 9:30 instead of 10:00.

Cha-Ching! $25 Million Race Discrimination Verdict - COTW #96

You put up numbers this big, and you've got a good great shot at landing Case of the Week honors. A New York jury awarded a steelworker $25 million in a race discrimination suit. What kind of treatment puts up numbers like this?

Elijah Turley still remembers the stuffed monkey with a noose around its neck found hanging from his driver's side mirror. He also remembers the "KKK" and "King Kong" graffiti on the walls of the Lackawanna steel plant where he worked for 14 years. And if that wasn't bad enough, there were the racial slurs from co-workers.

Sometimes it's hard to believe these things still go on in modern workplaces. And that was the line of attack the plaintiff's attorney used:

This case is about the breakdown of a man . . . . He wanted to be treated equally, treated equally in a culture that hadn't changed since the '50s.

Well, he has $25 million to build himself up again (alright, it will probably get reduced in one way or another - but still be a lot).

To the employer's credit, it did hire a private investigator, suspend employees, and install security cameras. I guess the jury felt that it just wasn't enough under the circumstances.

HT: Rich Meneghello via Twitter.

The Bachelor Discrimination Lawsuit (Full Complaint Here) - COTW #88

ABC... do you accept this rose? And by "rose" I mean discrimination lawsuit. Yup, the employment law case of the week is a class action lawsuit against ABC and others associated with production of The Bachelor and The Bachelorette. The basis for the lawsuit is pretty straightforward:

Never, over 10 years and a combined total of 23 seasons of The Bachelor and The Bachelorette, has either show ever featured a single person of color—whether African American, Latino, Asian, or any other minority race or ethnicity—in the central role of the "Bachelor" or "Bachelorette." In 16 seasons of The Bachelor and 7 seasons of The Bachelorette,every person featured in the lead role on either show has been white.

The claims are based on 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (racial discrimination in the making of contracts) and racial discrimination under California state law.

This should not be confused with the class action I'm planning to file on behalf of aggrieved husbands whose wives force them to watch these shows - contact me if interested ;-)

You can read the full complaint in the real lawsuit here:
(if you cannot see the embedded complaint, click here to view online)
Bachelor