Pennsylvania Enacts the CROWN Act: What Employers Need to Know

On November 25, 2025, Gov. Shapiro signed the Creating a Respectful and Open World for Natural Hair (CROWN) Act into law. The new law amends Pennsylvania's anti-discrimination law, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA) in a few important ways:

Broadens the definition of "race" to include hair texture and hairstyles

The PHRA prohibits discrimination based on race, and the definition of "race" now specifically includes "hair texture and protective hairstyles." "Protective hairstyles" include, but are not limited to, "locs, braids, twists, coils, Bantu knots, afros and extensions."

Broadens the definition of "religious creed" to include hairstyles and head coverings

The PHRA prohibits discrimination based on religious creed, and the definition of "religious creed" now specifically includes "head coverings and hairstyles historically associated with religious creeds."

Workplace health and safety rule and BFOQ exception

Employers may still adopt:

• An otherwise valid health and safety rule or policy; or
• Other rule or policy justified as a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). 

However, to establish the exception applies, the employer must demonstrate:

(i) Without the adoption of the rule or policy the health or safety of an employe or other materially connected person may be impaired; 

(ii) The rule or policy is adopted for nondiscriminatory reasons; 

(iii) The rule or policy is specifically tailored to the applicable position and activity; and 

(iv) The rule or policy is applied equally to individuals whose positions fall under the applicable position and activity.  

Effective Date: January 24, 2026

Third Circuit on Computer Fraud and Abuse Act for Employees

New and interesting decision from the Third Circuit in NRA Group, LLC v. Durenleau and Badaczewski.

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) prohibits "access[ing] a computer without authorization" and "exceeding authorized access." It imposes both civil and criminal liability. 

Here, the employer initiated CFAA actions against two former employees based on violations of the employer's computer use policies. As summarized by the Court:

Not official use.

While employed . . . Nicole Durenleau was out sick. She urgently needed a work document, but she had no way to access it. Her friend and colleague, Jamie Badaczewski, logged in to Durenleau’s computer from the office, accessed the document—a spreadsheet with Durenleau’s passwords—and emailed it to Durenleau. She did so with Durenleau’s express permission, but the pair’s actions, including Durenleau’s creation of the spreadsheet, breached workplace computer-use policies.

This violated numerous workplace rules, including sharing credentials, not maintaining exclusive control of IDs and passwords, storing login information in a "readable form" (the spreadsheet), accessing information the employee was not responsible for, etc.

Because the CFAA provides for both civil liability and criminal penalties, the Court cast the claims as the employer "ask[ing] us to make the employees' conduct a federal crime." The Third Circuit held "for the first time" that "the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, does not turn these workplace-policy infractions into federal crimes." Further, "we hold that, absent evidence of code-based hacking, the CFAA does not countenance claims premised on a breach of workplace computer-use policies by current employees."

Now, that is not to say that employers are left without any remedies for employee misuse of their computer systems. As the Court noted:

Indeed, there are many other causes of action—breach of contract, business torts, fraud, negligence, and so on—that provide a remedy for employers when employees grossly transgress computer-use policies.

This case has a ton of other issues (some of which were stayed pending the appeal). One additional interesting holding from this decision: "the passwords were not trade secrets" because they did not have "independent economic value." Put differently, "it is what the passwords protect, not the passwords, that is valuable." 

SCOTUS nixes universal injunctions

On its face, this case was about an executive order ending "birthright citizenship." But, Friday's decision in Trump v. CASA (Justice Barrett for the majority) was actually about the authority of district courts to grant "universal injunctions" - "the power to prohibit enforcement of a law or policy against anyone."

From a high-level policy perspective, there are some solid arguments for and against these nationwide injunctions:

• On the one hand, if the executive branch is doing something illegal - violating constitutional rights or exceeding the scope of its federal legislative or constitutional authority - why would a court not be able to stop it from breaking the law everywhere? It's convenient. It creates uniformity.

• On the other hand, why should one district judge - who is one of several district judges in a court that only has jurisdiction over one state (and often, only a small part of one state) - determine the law and executive branch power for the entire country? It effectively gives a district judge with very limited jurisdiction a veto power over the entire executive branch. Plus, there's forum shopping.  

Justice Barrett

However, the Supreme Court determines what the law is and not what it ought to be. "The issue before us is one of remedy: whether, under the Judiciary Act of 1789, federal courts have equitable authority to issue universal injunctions." Long story, short: The Court looked at the equitable powers of courts when the Judiciary Act was enacted and concluded that universal injunctions were not authorized and therefore impermissible. Instead, injunctions may not be "broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue."

Now, you may be asking how this relates to employment law. Remember these?

• Pres. Obama's increase to the minimum salary threshold for the white collar exemptions to the FLSA overtime requirements;
• Pres. Biden's FTC rule effectively banning (most) noncompetes; and
• Pres. Biden's increase to the minimum salary threshold for the white collar exemptions to the FLSA overtime requirements.

All of them were initially stopped by district court rulings.  

The Future

A couple of notes about the ruling:

• The Court only ruled on whether the Judiciary Act authorized federal district courts to issue universal injunctions. It did not decide whether Article III of the Constitution permits them. In other words, Congress could amend the Judiciary Act to allow universal injunctions. One, I don't see that happening anytime soon. And, two, that would then require analysis of the Article III question, and I don't know how SCOTUS would rule on that. 
• District courts can still afford injunctive relief to "plaintiffs with standing" - in a concurring opinion, Justice Alito notes, "Lax enforcement of the requirements for third-party standing and class certification would create a potentially significant loophole to today’s decision.
• Worth noting that SCOTUS, in a footnote, stated "Nothing we say today resolves the distinct question whether the Administrative Procedure Act authorizes federal courts to vacate federal agency action. See 5 U. S. C. §706(2) (authorizing courts to 'hold unlawful and set aside agency action')."

SCOTUS: A Reverse Discrimination Claim is Just Another Discrimination Claim

Yesterday, the Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision in Ames v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Services. No surprises here. The plaintiff in Ames was a heterosexual employee who was passed over for a job in favor of a lesbian woman. Ames claimed that she was discriminated against based on her sexual orientation. 

Justice Jackson

Some circuit courts (although, notably *not* the Third Circuit where I practice) had held that a plaintiff in a Title VII discrimination claim who is a member of a majority group must make an additional showing of "background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority." This created a higher evidentiary standard for plaintiffs in a majority group. 

The SCOTUS opinion, authored by Justice Jackson eliminated this extra requirement: "We hold that this additional 'background circumstances' requirement is not consistent with Title VII’s text or our case law construing the statute." And, "the standard for proving disparate treatment under Title VII does not vary based on whether or not the plaintiff is a member of a majority group." So, a reverse discrimination claim is just another discrimination claim. 

This was pretty much a foregone conclusion before the opinion even came out, but now it's official. Perhaps more interestingly, Justice Thomas (joined by Justice Gorsuch) signaled "In a case where the parties ask us to do so, I would be willing to consider whether the McDonnell Douglas framework is a workable and useful evidentiary tool." The framework is currently used in disparate treatment claims based on circumstantial evidence (which is most of them), and McDonnell Douglas is one of the most cited SCOTUS decisions ever. 

New Third Circuit Religious Accommodation Case - Beards and Air Masks

An interesting new precedential decision from the Third Circuit in Smith v. City of Atlantic City was published on May 30, 2025. The fire department prohibited a Christian employee from growing a beard of any length in violation of his religious beliefs. 

Not official use.

The plaintiff was classified as a firefighter but actually worked as an Air Mask Technician. Accordingly, he had not actually fought a fire since 2015 and instead served on scene away from the smoke and assisted the firefighters with their "self-contained breathing apparatuses" (SCBAs). The plaintiff himself could not properly wear a SCBA with a beard because the beard would preclude a seal from forming. 

Would allowing him to grow a beard impose an "undue hardship?" The Third Circuit vacated the entry of summary judgment for the employer:

It is telling that no Air Mask Technician has been called to engage in fire suppression for several decades . . . The City can only theorize a vanishingly small risk that Smith will be called in to engage in the sort of firefighting activities for which an SCBA is required. There are no other personnel—whether administrators or active firefighters—who are seeking an accommodation relating to the SCBAs, so the risk that the City will be unable to respond to an emergency safely is all the more unlikely. 

Thus the plaintiff may proceed on his Title VII religious accommodation claim (and also a constitutional Free Exercise Clause claim).

PA Medical Marijuana and Employment Law

A quick slide presentation highlighting the key employment-related provisions of Pennsylvania's Medical Marijuana Act (and some guidance on CDLs):

Third Circuit: Home Health Aide travel time between client sites is compensable under the FLSA

Time spent by Home Health Aides (HHAs) traveling between client sites is compensable time under the FLSA and therefore must be paid time. This remains true even if the HHA has some off-duty time immediately before or after the travel.
DOJ v. Nursing Home Care Management, Inc. (3d Cir., Jan. 31, 2025).